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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
THE PROBLEM OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN
VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER
Protection against twice being put in jeopardy for the same offense is found
not only in the United States Constitution1 but also in most state constitutions.2
A plea of former jeopardy although a bar to a subsequent trial 3 must be based
upon a former prosecution for the "same identical offense," 4 a term which is
subject to divergent interpretation. The effect of these divergent views as to the
meaning of the concept "same offense" is clearly focused when several persons
are killed or injured by the culpably negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
A conflict exists among the various jurisdictions as to whether a person who
kills or injures two or more persons at the same time while operating an
automobile in a reckless or culpably negligent manner has committed one or
more offenses against the state. It naturally follows that if there is more than
one offense, more than one prosecution and punishment will be allowed; and
if there is only one offense, one prosecution will be a bar to future prosecutions.
A majority6 of the states that have passed on the issue have decided that the
defendant has committed as many offenses as there are victims; the minority 7
hold that one reckless act is but one offense regardless of the number of victims.
Vehicular manslaughter, as is true of involuntary manslaughter generally,
is the unlawful killing of a human being unintentionally and without malice
while in the commission of a lawful act performed in a negligent manner.8
Negligence satisfies the requisite of criminal intent necessary for a criminal
prosecution9 but the negligence must be greater than that required for civil
liability.10 While there is no iatisfactory definition of the degree of negligence
1. U.S. Const. amend. V; Willis, Constitutional Law 259 (1936).
2. All but five states' constitutions have safeguards against double jeopardy; Connecti-
cut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Vermont. Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937), held that neither the due process clause nor the privileges and Im-
munities clause impose upon the states the prohibition against twice putting a person in
jeopardy for the same offense. See also Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65
Harv. L. Rev. 818, 874 (1952).
3. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
4. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
5. Notes, 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 79 (1938), 45 Harv. L. Rev. 535 (1932), 40 Yale L.J.
462 (1931).
6. Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Washington.
7. Iowa, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee.
8. Harding v. State, 26 Ariz. 334, 225 Pac. 482 (1924); People v. Kelley, 24 Cal.
App. 54, 140 Pac. 302 (1914); State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933);
State v. Pond, 125 Me. 453, 134 At. 572 (1926).
9. Holmes, The Common Law 75 (1881); 6 Cornell L.Q. 105, 106 (1920).
10. Maryland v. Chapman, 101 F. Supp. 335 (D. Md. 1951); People v. Schwartz, 298
Ill. 218, 131 N.E. 806 (1921); State v. Rountree, 181 N.C. 535, 106 S.E. 669 (1921).
There are two standards for determining whether the essential degree of negligence Is
present, i.e., the subjective and the objective standard. Bussard v. State, 233 Wis. 11,
288 N.W. 187 (1939); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165 (1884).
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necessary the courts have, as a guide, classified the conduct as "wanton,"
"gross," "wilful," and "reckless." In the final analysis, however, it is for the
jury to determine whether the conduct imputes a criminal intent."
The crime, then, consists of some injury caused by the reckless act plus the
criminal intent which is in turn imputed from the very recklessness of the act.
The question that arises is whether this one act is single and indivisible or
whether it can support a separate offense in regard to each individual injured
as a consequence thereof.
MINoRITY R rE
The earliest case to deal with this problem was State v. Cosgrove .- There,
the defendant was responsible for the death of one person and the serious
injury of another. The court held that since the death and injury were the
direct result of the same identical act, which constituted only one criminal
offense, the defendant could successfully plead autrefois acquit 3 in a prosecu-
tion for atrocious assault and battery when he had previously been acquitted of
manslaughter.' 4
Two years later, a Tennessee court' 5 in an almost identical situation said,
"The criminal intent present [in the crimes charged] is an imputed disregard
of the safety of all persons who might be in the way of the recdessly and un-
lawfully driven automobile, and no act or intent can be charged against the
[defendant] ...as affecting either of the two injured [persons] .. .to the
exclusion of the other. The [defendant] ... was guilty of a single unlawful act
with a single unlawful intent, and therefore can only be punished for a single
offense or crime."' 6 Therefore, a conviction for manslaughter was a bar to a
prosecution for assault and battery arising out of the same reckless act. This
case notes that in negligent manslaughter there is no actual intent to harm
11. 6 Cornell L.Q. 105 (1920).
12. 103 N.J.L. 412, 135 AU. 871 (1927); see State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361 (Sup. Ct.
1833). The doctrine elicited in the Cosgrove case was affirmed and extended in State v.
Pennsylvania R.R, 9 N.J. 194, 87 A.2d 709 (1952). The railroad company was indicted
eight-four separate times for manslaughter for the deaths of eighty-four people who were
killed in an accident. The trial court allowed a consolidation of the indictments. The
appellate division reversed. The supreme court affirmed the reveral on the ground that
if the indictments were consolidated, the defendant would be deprived of its right to
enter a plea of autrefois acquit or autrefols convict to any one of the other indictments
after a judgment of guilty or not guilty had been rendered in the first prosecution. The
court said, ". . . the number of crimes or offenses in this jurisdiction is not decided by
the number of deaths." Id. at 198, 87 A.2d at 711.
13. "The name of a plea in bar to a criminal action, stating that the defendant
has been once already indicted and tried for the same alleged offense and has been
acquitted." Black, Law Dictionary 170 (4th ed. 1951).
14. Since it was held that there was only one offense, the same result could have been
reached by an application of the doctrine of res judicata, which applies to criminal cases.
United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916); Comment, Res Judicata in Criminal
Cases, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 231 (1948).
15. Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 21 S.W.2d 400 (1929).
16. Id. at 633-84, 21 S.W.2d at 402.
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and so distinguishes this situation from intentional homicides. 17 Reckless con-
duct, the court indicated, will only support an inference that the defendant has
a general criminal intent but not that he intends to injure each victim.
Iowa followed this reasoning in State v. Wheelock,'18 where the defendant
was involved in an automobile accident wherein a mother and two daughters
were killed. Having been indicted three times for involuntary manslaughter, he
was tried and acquitted for death of the mother. The lower court sustained
pleas of autrefois acquit to the other two indictments. The supreme court, in
affirming said ". . . every material allegation charged in each indictment was
completely negatived by the acquittal upon the first prosecution. . . . [I]f the
defendant was not guilty of the conduct that resulted in the death of [the
mother] . . . he could not be guilty of causing the death of either daughter.
The acquittal in the first prosecution would be completely contradicted by a
conviction in the second." 9 The court held that ". . . an act of negligence ...
which results in the involuntary killing of two or more human beings, is
ordinarily a single offense and is subject to one prosecution. '20
In Commonwealth v. McCord2 ' the defendant's negligence was responsible
for the death of one person and injuries to two others. He was convicted of
assault and battery, aggravated assault and battery and involuntary man-
slaughter, and given successive sentences for the last two convictions. The
superior court reversed the sentence for aggravated assault and battery on the
ground that there was only one unlawful act. The Pennsylvania court, cogni-
zant of the fact that they were dealing with a unique situation, evolved the
anomalous rule that although multiple offenses had been committed, the de-
fendant could be punished only once.
Although the McCord case appears to be a third view, closer examination
indicates that the court relied on Commonwealth v. Veley,22 as binding au-
thority. There, the defendant was acquitted of involuntary manslaughter
resulting from the alleged negligent management of a dam. Thereafter, the
defendant was charged with the death of another victim of the same accident.
The court said the former acquittal was a bar stating that criminal prosecution
17. In People v. Warren, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 338 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852), it was held
that a former acquittal in the charge of administering poison with the intent to kill one
person would not bar a subsequent action charging the same crime based upon the same
facts where it was alleged that defendant intended to kill the second person also. It was
held that "the intent in these cases is the material constituent of the crime. Though the
acts may have been the same, the crimes as characterized by the intent are different,"
Id. at 339. Cf. People ex rel. Flinn v. Barr, 259 N.Y. 104, 181 N.E. 64 (1932) which
cites the Cosgrove case with approval.
18. 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933).
19. Id. at 1433, 250 N.W. at 619.
20. Id. at 1448, 250 N.W. at 625.
21. 116 Pa. Super. 480, 176 AUt. 834 (1935). See Commonwealth v. Carroll, 131 Pa.
Super. 357, 200 At. 139 (1938).
22. 63 Pa. Super. 489 (1916); Commonwealth v. Ernesto, 93 Pa. Super. 339 (1928).
These two decisions were the authorities which the McCord case cited as supporting its
decision.
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is for injury to the state and when there is one cause of the injury, there is but
one injury to the state.23 This reasoning is consistent with the minority view.
Under the minority view, then, when there is one reckless act and no specific
intent to harm each victim, there is only one offense. The reckless conduct
will impute a general intent to harm but not an intention to injure each victim.
There being only one act with one criminal intent, there can be only one
offense. The minority clearly distinguishes this situation from intentional
homicides resulting from a single act which are more than one offense.
IMAJoRITY RULE
Since 1936, however, every state court which has ruled on the point has held
that the number of victims determines the number of offenses.2 4 The first case
to adopt this view was State v. Talor.25 The court, in upholding multiple con-
victions reasoned: "Even though two persons are killed by the same act, as
by one bullet from a rifle, each killing constitutes a separate crime." 0 To
support this reasoning the court relied upon a case involving murder in the
first degree.27 The Washington court declined to draw any distinction between
the actual intent to kill present in cases of voluntary homicide and the construc-
tive intent predicated on recklessness deemed sufficient to support a conviction
for involuntary homicide. This failure to distinguish between voluntary and
involuntary homicide is found in every case that follows the majority view.
The holding of the Taylor case made it possible to subject d defendant to
three consecutive sentences for manslaughter and raised the question of whether
a defendant should be committed to what may amount to a life sentence because
of one reckless or culpably negligent act. Webb v. Statc2 gave an affirmative
answer. There convictions under five separate counts and consecutive sentences
were affirmed on the ground that there is "... no reason why the presumption
of knowledge of the exact consequences [of his act] cannot be imputed to the
defendant as well as the presumption of malice and intent. By his unlawful
act he [the defendant] placed himself in the position of impliedly intending to
commit the crime, and, as he 'knew the natural and necessary consequences
that would result,' it follows that he intended (by implication) to drive the
automobile into the other car, and that he had knowledge (by implication) that
the other carried five persons, three of whom would be killed and two injured
by his unlawful act."-'
The possible results of the majority view, when carried to its logical conclu-
sion, are demonstrated in the recent case of Burton v. State.O Defendant killed
23. 63 Pa. Super. at 496.
24. 8 Ala. L. Rev. 372 (1956), 23 Iowa L. Rev. 425 (1938).
25. 185 Wash. 198, 52 P.2d 1252 (1936).
26. Id. at 204, 52 P.2d at 1255.
27. State v. Robinson, 12 Wash. 491, 41 Pac. S34 (1895).
28. 6S Ga. App. 466, 23 S.E.2d 578 (1942).
29. Id. at 470, 23 S.E,2d at 581.
30. 79 So. 2d 242 (Aiss. Sup. Ct. 1955), 27 Miss. L.J. 64, 8 Ala. L. Rev. 372
(1956). Similiar decisions are Holder v. Fraser, 215 Ark. 67, 219 S.W.2d 625 (1949)
(on the ground that recklessness is so akin to intention that the defendant %,,ill be treated
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three people in an automobile accident, was indicted separately for each death
in 1945 but was tried and convicted for only one. In 1955, after serving ten
years of a twenty year sentence, he was again tried, convicted and sentenced
for another twenty years for the death of the second person. A majority of the
Mississippi Supreme Court held that since there were two offenses, the de-
fendant was liable to a prosecution for each. The dissenting justices argued
that, "To now impose an additional twenty year sentence upon the accused, and
with the right on the part of the State at the end of such period or prior thereto
to try him on the third indictment, could amount to a life sentence for less
than a capital felony, that is to say, a life sentence for one culpably negligent
act."31
The leading case propounding the majority rule is State v. Fredlund.82 The
defendant, whose reckless driving of his automobile caused an accident in which
a mother and son were killed, was acquitted of murder in the third degree for
the death of the mother. Subsequently, to an indictment charging the same
crime in regard to the son, he entered a plea of autrefois acquit. The court
denied the plea on the ground that two offenses were involved, drawing an
analogy to the availability of separate civil actions for the injured parties. The
cases the court cited as directly in point 33 and the analogies they drew were
situations where the wrongdoer actually intended to commit more than one
crime, as for example, "... . one might poison a well from which many persons
might die because the water therefrom was used by many persons residing in
that locality. One might throw a bomb into a large crowd of people and thereby
injure many and possibly kill several. ' 34 Certainly these analogies are distin-
guishable. In the poison and the bomb cases, there would be not only a
specific and actual intent to injure, but a multiple intent, that is, an actual
intent to kill or injure more than one person. In these situations even though
involving one act, more than one offense results. However, in the Fredlund
case, there was no actual intent to kill.
The majority implicitly recognize that a merely single act cannot constitute
several offenses of involuntary manslaughter. The majority, however, discern in
the reckless conduct the intention to injure each victim, a result arrived at by
extending to its logical conclusion the principle that a person intends the
as though he intended to kill the three people); Fay v. State, 62 Okla. Crim. 350, 358,
71 P.2d 768, 771 (1937); Flemming v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 209, 144 S.W.2d 220
(1940).
31. 79 So. 2d at 251 (dissenting opinion).
32. 200 Minn. 44, 273 NAV. 353 (1937), 23 Iowa L. Rev. 425 (1938), 5 Chl. L. Rev.
140 (1937). To the same effect, Jeppesen v. State, 154 Neb. 765, 49 N.W.2d 611 (1951)
(the conviction was reversed, however, for lack of evidence); State v. Martin, 154 Ohio
St. 539, 96 N.E.2d 776 (1951). The concurring opinion in the Martin case, however,
stated that the question of whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied
to a criminal case was left open because it had not been raised by the defendant.
33. State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 At. 98 (1934); State v. Corbett, 117 S.C. 356,
109 S.E. 133 (1921); People v. Majors, 65 Cal. 138, 3 Pac. 597 (1884).
34. 200 Minn. at 54, 273 N.W. at 358.
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natural and necessary consequences of his act. 5 Having a specific intent to
injure each victim, the courts hold there are as many offenses as victims, apply-
ing the principles applicable to intentional homicides.'
CONCLUSION
In voluntary manslaughter resulting from a single act, there are as many
offenses as victims. The specific intent to kill each victim is the material
constituent of separate offenses.37 The reckless driver, however, does not
actually intend to kill anyone but rather the law imputes the intention to kill
from his reckless conduct.as The position of the majority would seem to be
weakened by its failure to recognize the distinction between actual and imputed
intent. This weakness is emphasized by the reasoning of the Webb case, where
the court concedes that only by heaping implication upon implication is it
able to arrive at a multiple intent.1 In negligent manslaughter, the defendant
may realize that he is increasing the danger to other human beings but to
assume that a negligent driver actually intends to cause an accident is rather
arbitrary. The legal fiction that a person intends the natural consequences of
his act, serves a beneficial purpose to the extent that it makes the reckless driver
amenable to punishment by society. However, when the court by adding im-
plication upon implication arrives at a multiple intent, which is the basis for
multiple offenses, the decision is at best questionable.
The majority position may also be criticized for its failure to give effect to a
prior acquittal. The basis of a defendant's guilt or innocence is exactly the
same as in the former prosecution, that is, the reckless conduct. The doctrine of
collateral estoppe 40 should be applied by the court to bar the second prosecu-
tion.4 ' The Fredlund case stated that "the only thing determined by the prior
adjudication is that as to her [the mother's] death the proof of the defendant's
35. Webb v. State, 68 Ga. App. 466, 23 S.E.2d 578 (1942); see Holder v. Fraser, 215
Ark. 67, 219 S.W.2d 625 (1949).
36. People v. Warren, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 333 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1852).
37. "Though, the acts may have been the same, the crimes as characterized by the
intent are different. ' Id. at 339.
38. Webb v. State, 6S Ga. App. 466, 23 S.E.2d 573 (1942).
39. Id. at 470, 23 S.E.2d at 581.
40. "Collateral estoppel is that aspect of res judicata concerned with the effect of a
final judgment on subsequent litigation of a different cause of action involving some
of the same issues determined in the initial action. The usual succinct statement of the
rule is that where an issue of fact.. . 'essential to the judgment is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between the
parties. . ." Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 840
(1952). See Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1942).
41. United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943); United States v. Carlis
32 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1942). These cases, however, indicate that a former conviction cannot be uwzd
against the defendant as a collateral estoppel of any issue in a later prosecution because2
the defendant has a constitutional right to a trial of every issue raied in a pro:ccution
for a separate crime.
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